

Yuri Yarim-Agaev – Freedom Fighter

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Peter Robinson: Welcome to *Uncommon Knowledge*. I'm Peter Robinson. A distinguished young physicist in the 1970's, Yuri Yarim-Agaev was a graduate student at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, the Soviet Union's MIT, when he joined the dissident movement. In 1978, Yuri joined the Moscow Helsinki Group, the dissident organization that monitored Soviet compliance or noncompliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. His fellow members of the organization included the physicist Yuri Orlov and Yelena Bonner, the wife of Andrei Sakharov. In 1980, well, we'll come to what happened in 1980. Now a financial analyst in New York, Yuri devotes a great deal of his time to ensuring that the lessons of Soviet communism are not forgotten. Yuri, welcome.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Thank you.

Peter Robinson: Yuri, the nature of communism, two quotations. Historian Robert Conquest: —The Soviet assumption that all other political life forms and beliefs were inherently and immutably hostile was the simple and central cause of the Cold War. Quotation number two, historian Robert Harris: —If only it had been Trotsky who had succeeded Lenin and not Stalin, then the USSR might have been spared its famines and its terrors, its show trials and its denials of freedom. Was communism inherently hostile or was communism somehow a grand plan that Stalin hijacked?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, it's absolutely essential to realize that it's inherently hostile and I am hundred percent with Bob Conquest not only because he is good friend of mine, but mainly because I completely agree with him. It's, well, there is empirical proof of that. We can look at all communist countries, and they're all the same, in a sense. I mean, in all major features. You wouldn't find one distinction between Soviet communism, Chinese communism, North Korean communism. Whenever communism was established in this world, it repeated all terrible features of communism. Stalin was only in one country. But there were other Ho Chi Minhs, Castros and Mao Tse-Tung, all the same. It's absolutely predetermined model. Now, one thing we should understand about totalitarian society, is that it doesn't give much room for any interpretation. It's pretty much preset. So communism was first defined strictly by Marx; then modified by Lenin. And in that form, actually, is implemented from one country to another, with hardly any variations.

Peter Robinson: So I want to ask about the Russian-ness of Soviet communism. Daniel Pipes, quote: —Nowhere in the west has Marxism lead to the totalitarian excess of Leninism-Stalinism.

In Russia, Marxism fell on a soil devoid of traditions of self-rule, law and private property. So Daniel Pipes makes the point, he argues – it runs through all his work, that there's something distinctively Russian about Soviet communism. That Stalin is unthinkable if he hadn't been communist, but also very hard to suppose if he hadn't been drawing on Russian traditions of autocracy and so forth. Does that make sense to you?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: No, I disagree, is Richard Pipes.

Peter Robinson: Richard, I'm sorry, I misspoke. It's Richard. His son is Daniel, sorry, thank you.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: And I disagree. What I can say that different countries may be susceptible to different extent to communism. So there is greater or lesser chance for communism to conquer this or that country. And say definitely United States or England with their traditions of democracy for many centuries has the strongest immunity to communism. Now, Russia didn't have such a strong immunity, as well as China and some other countries. But it would an illusion to think that if communism takes root in some society, it would have a more benevolent form than it was in Russia. So it's a matter which country is more or less susceptible to this form of the government. But we shouldn't have any illusions that if that government, if that system is established any society, it would be as terrible as it was in the Soviet Union.

Peter Robinson: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, speaking at Harvard in 1978, his famous commencement address at Harvard. Quote: —Anguish about our divided world gave birth to the theory of convergence." That is to say the Soviet Union and the west were growing more and more alike. "These worlds are not developing into similarity. If only you . . . this is Solzhenitsyn speaking to the faculty and students of Harvard, — . . . if only you knew how the Moscow officials laugh at your political wizards. Solzhenitsyn was right?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes. He was hundred percent right. And this policy of convergence was pushed by Kremlin and ironically I would say it continues after the death of the Soviet communism. For some strange reasons, and that's one of the most strange fact to me, after democratic capitalism so decisively defeated Soviet communists –

Peter Robinson: Oh, we won?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes, in that specific part of the war –

Peter Robinson: I want to come to that. But there are all kinds of people who say it just ended, nobody won. All right, all right, go ahead.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: It hasn't ended and it was real war, ideological war, but very important warfare between two opposite system of both political and economic system. And what is amazing, is that after such a decisive victory of democracy and capitalism over communism, the lessons that were learned were very strange. And we, for some strange reason, still see some communist tendency developing inside our own country, here.

Peter Robinson: Segment Two. Yuri and your own story as a dissident. As a young man, you represent the very flower of Soviet communism. You were a brilliant young scientist. You come of age some decades after the revolution. There's nothing of the old regime about you. You are a product of the modern Soviet state. And yet, when still in your twenties, you become a dissident. Why did you put that brilliant career at risk? Why did you turn against the system that had produced you?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: The answer to that was a sense of personal responsibility. Just because I felt that I was – became as early [age?] a part of that elite, which had maybe more information and understanding of what happened in the society, I felt more responsible for reacting to what I didn't like. And I didn't like a lot of things. I actually disagreed on principle with that system. But also, I realized that I had maybe more immunity than many others, because scientists in the Soviet Union have very high social status. And I had more immunity, in terms that I could do more before being arrested or killed than many other people. So it was a suicidal mission in any case, and I am saying it always it – if you were not ready to die, you shouldn't have become dissident, because you would have been broken by the KGB, they would sense it instantly. You know if you're not ready to go to the very end, don't even try.

Peter Robinson: Tell us about what happened in 1980. I want to – tell me the story about when you discovered, the way in which you discovered that you were being shown the door.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes. But let me tell you one thing before, which was important. The key to, I would say success of this at moment, two things were critical in securing our success. First that we resolve totally to non-violent movement. We totally denied any violence. Second, that we operated absolutely open. We always would sign our names under any document, etc. Why is that important? Because there were attempts before dissidents to create some underground organization, etc., and there were some armed organizations. All of them were crushed instantly by the KGB, because the secrecy and force was KGB turf when they were very strong. However, the openness and non-violence were the weakness of the communist system. And that's why we prevailed, actually. Because here, the KGB, it's like vampires in the daylight, you know. They became very weak when it was started to do so openly. So we didn't conceal anything. And what

happened with me, at one day I was followed twenty-four hours. There were two cars usually following me. And at one day I was –

Peter Robinson: This was standard. When you made your way through Moscow, you were used to being followed.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, that's standard, but it's very few people – you can calculate simply resources which are required for that they are enormous. So it was, I was followed consistently for last three or four months. I was followed before, also, often but on more random basis. For last three months of my being in the Soviet Union, it was consistent twenty-four hours full. And then one day, several guys came, pushed me into one car, brought to the office of police not of KGB, which was funny. But there two top KGB officers in those cars, the level of colonels. And there was conversation which was started by the head of this police office who appeared to be totally uninformed, you know, who I was and what I was doing, because he was given this phoney role to accuse me of some crimes, etc. And when the KGB, two KGB officers were sitting on the side, when they realized that he is incapable to carry out his phoney assignment, they said, —We'll take care of it from here. From this moment we'll do it. And he, the boss of this police office, he asked them, —Can I stay or should I leave? They say, —Okay, you can stay, but shut up. And that was, then it was very frank. They gave me the paper, which is was official warning, which actually said, accused me of my activities as Moscow Helsinki Group member, and my major crime was that I was actually the main person in the group, who was in touch with American and British diplomats. And many of them were friends of mine, so I was –

Peter Robinson: This is true, they did –

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely.

Peter Robinson: They fabricated charges.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: And again, that I did absolutely openly, also. Right, and that, absolutely it was true, and that was one of the ways for me to convey our information, etc.; and but by Soviet standards, it was high treason actually. To be, for an ordinary Soviet citizen without official permission to get into contact with diplomats of such bad countries of America or England, it was simply high treason. So the warning was very clear. I mean, criminal article which was mentioned in this warning was Article 64, which was high treason, which assumed capital punishment. And they told me, —Look, that what we can do, and we may do, but we give you alternative. You may leave the country. If you leave the country within a month before summer Olympic games would start in Moscow. They didn't want me to stay until – it

was 1980.

Peter Robinson: They didn't want you demonstrating. They didn't want you demonstrating in front of western cameras.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yeah, and also to be in touch with many important people who would come, "we would let you go." I say, —Wait a second, but I never applied for any immigration. I didn't attempt." They told me, —Don't worry, I mean, we'll leave whenever you decide to do so. Now, why it happened, it's important because there was already this strong campaign on my behalf, which was started by American scientist. Andrei Sakharov was already exiled to Gorky at that time.

Peter Robinson: Internal exile.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yuri Orlov was already arrested and was in labor camp. Anatoly Sharansky, my good friend, who was also scientist was also arrested. It created very strong and successful campaign in America, which was actually organized here in Bay Area by my good friends who worked at that time at Berkeley lab. They created organization which was called Sakharov Sharansky in defense of scientist. They couldn't do much at that time about Sakharov or Sharansky at that time because they already arrested.

Peter Robinson: Already arrested, right.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: But it helped a lot me and several other scientists who were on the verge of arrest, because it was easier to prevent person to being arrested than to get out. Eventually, as you know, Sakharov and Sharansky were released. So that's how I was exiled.

Peter Robinson: Segment Three: How to fight a cold war. You've drawn up a list, you mentioned this a moment ago, but I want to go through it. You've drawn up a list of the rules or principles that informed the dissident movement in the Soviet Union. Let's go through a few of these. Nonviolent resistance to a violent regime. Why not engage in acts of sabotage? Why not be like the IRS [sic IRA] in Northern Ireland.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, first of all, if you ask me personally, I disagree on moral and principled grounds, but if you ask it as a practical question, which is very important, the answer is very simple, because violence is trend of KGB and the Soviet communism. You actually would always lose if you use their weapon. Look, we were talking about super power which had more arms than the United States of America. I mean, it's very naive to think that you can with several

shotguns or, I don't know, pistols, you can fight against the country with hundreds of thousands of nuclear missiles. So that's important. But never – if you have very strong opponent, never try to compete with this opponent on its territory; try to choose the – in what is really weak.

Peter Robinson: Human Rights: Human rights is the primary concern and uniting principle.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely. That's war, because what communism is about is total denial of human rights. It cannot afford any human rights. I mean, it cannot afford any political and civil rights. Let's say that communism always claims that it provides the people social economic rights, but it totally denies political and civil rights. That's a death blow for communism, and if you, and it totally undermines legitimacy of the communist system. When you start to hold it accountable on that matter, it has nothing to say in defense.

Peter Robinson: So, here's what – you read Lenin and you read Trotsky, you read all the founding revolutionaries, and over and over again they're talking about inventing a new kind of human being, the new Soviet man, the entirely new set of values. So there are two puzzles here for me. One is, where did Yuri and Sakharov and Sharansky, where did you get your notion of human rights? Was it to some extent religious? Where do you pick up the principles of human rights? And then the second is, it seems to me that by arguing human rights, your premise is that there's something even in the KGB, you are touching something within them.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes.

Peter Robinson: That at some level, they know you're right.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely. And that actually was our main force, that we actually corrupted, helped to corrupt this whole system on the top. And when you look into some memoirs which were written after '91 by some top Soviet official, particularly by Alexander Yakovlev, he recognizes in his writing how important was reading of our documents and our statements by the top leaders of Communist Party and even KGB, was spoils them. Now, how we learned about human rights, well, Peter, the answer number one is, I believe it's very natural thing. It's kind of comes with us naturally for human beings, you ideal human rights.

Peter Robinson: Natural law. You're a believer in –

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Pretty much, pretty much so. But, also, we were quite educated people, and even in the absence of many things that were published officially in the Soviet Union, you can still read a lot of things from which you – I mean, we were very well read on western

civilization, you know. So we knew and understood many things.

Peter Robinson: Right.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: So it wasn't that we were totally isolated from any information.

Peter Robinson: Here's another one of your principles or rules: Moral resistance, moral resistance.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes.

Peter Robinson: High principals of ethics and honor. Now, this is another puzzle for me, because you've already explained that the core, or at least one of the most important elements of the dissident movement, was made up of scientists.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes.

Peter Robinson: And in this country, academics tend to stay away from the categories of moral imperatives.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Right.

Peter Robinson: And you're embracing them.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely.

Peter Robinson: You're saying right and wrong matter.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely. You cannot be dissident without moral imperative. As I told you in the beginning, if you are not ready to die, or stand in for being dissident, you will be broken. I mean, your only weapon is resolve. You cannot get such resolve, and KGB knew and felt it well enough, you know, to diagnose who is who and how strong you are. And if you are not strong enough, you will be broken.

Peter Robinson: In some perverse way, the KGB was good at what they did.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, yes. I mean they –

Peter Robinson: They knew.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: In that perverse way, they were, they were, actually. I mean, they would test everyone, you know, but they would feel, if they feel that the person is strong, they wouldn't actually even try to, because they could, they could imprison, because they would imprison most of such people because they had to, but they would realize that they cannot break this person. Now, what can give you such resolve, if not moral imperative? What can give you readiness to die for that cause, if not moral imperative? Well, scientist can also have moral, you know, that's the discovery which you can learn from dissidents' community in Soviet Union. But we realize, you know, but you maybe have to live through communism which totally denies the whole concept of good and evil, to realize how those things are important for human being and for human society.

Peter Robinson: Yuri, was it an evil empire?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely.

Peter Robinson: Ah. Segment Four: How it ended. Within months of becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev begins speaking of perestroika, reform, restructuring. He seems to have believed that he could somehow create a Communist Party that was in some way or another open to democracy. You could run various candidates within the party for positions. He seems to have believed that he could have had some sort of opening to free markets, and made the economy more efficient, and that all of this would have been consistent, in some way, with communism. Was he onto something or naive from the very beginning?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, it wasn't naive; it was inevitable situation. Let's say first of all, very clearly, that the only goal which Gorbachev had is to – was to save communism. That was his only purpose. Now, let's also remember that Gorbachev was kind of reformer different from all other top communists. He was nominated unanimously by Politburo to the position of First Secretary, and he actually received mandate for making reform, because everyone realized, on the top of communist government, that they must make those reforms.

Peter Robinson: That something had to give.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yeah, absolutely. Communism couldn't simply survive, you know, without reform. So those reforms made by Gorbachev were not caused by his love to freedom or any human right, but by sheer necessity to save communist system. Now, it was impossible to save it. So it's – you can say that he was naive, but he actually tried to do whatever was possible to

do, and the system was doomed to collapse, as it did. So, his power was very limited, you know.

Peter Robinson: 1953, the Soviets crushed the East German workers uprising.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Right.

Peter Robinson: 1956, tanks roll into Budapest and crush the Hungarian revolution. 1968, tanks roll into Prague. Prague Spring blotted out. 1989, Gorbachev visits East Berlin and says to Honecker, you're on your own. I will not put down this movement. And Gorbachev permits the wall to fall and the so-called Velvet Revolutions to sweep across Eastern Europe. Why?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Why, because –

Peter Robinson: He's a better human being than his predecessors?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: No, not at all. Look, I actually never met Gorbachev, and I don't care actually about his personality, because it's actually irrelevant. Now, I get, for one moment, at the beginning of our conversation, when we talked whether there exists different forms of communism; some more malignant, some more benevolent. And I say no, that communism was predetermined form that actually repeats itself in the same circle. However, it has different stages of development. And you also can observe it any communist society. It starts with very young ideology, which is very strong because it's young. It actually conquers a lot of talents in the society to establish itself very strong. And at the first stage after it is established, it's very difficult to do something with that, because it really has some support and some roots in the society. And one of the reasons of failure of the Bay of Pigs operation by United States was exactly the timing, because the ideology at that moment was very fresh and strong in Cuba.

Peter Robinson: Cubans still supported it, at some level in some way, they still supported Fidel, they were for the revolution.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes. However, this ideology goes through several stages and it becomes weaker and weaker. It fails to recruit talents and strong people from the society, and that's what was admitted by KGB itself, in one interrogation of my friend, the KGB colonel said to him "if we only had such people as you dissidents in our ranks." So they admitted that many good people now started to go to dissidents rather to KGB or to Central Committee. But overall, the ideology becomes weaker and weaker. So, when you mention those days with Berlin, with Hungary, with Czechoslovakia, etc., at that time, ideology was still strong enough. But when the Soviets

invaded Afghanistan, I remember, my word was that that's the end of the Soviet Union. That's already was²

Peter Robinson: You knew it.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely.

Peter Robinson: '79, you're still inside the Soviet Union –

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely.

Peter Robinson: You knew at that moment there was an overreach.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes. I knew that that was overreach. That was adventure which didn't have root and support in that country any longer, that that was the beginning of the end of communism in the Soviet Union.

Peter Robinson: All right. There are different theories, different ways of explaining the collapse of the Soviet Union. One is imperial overreach, it just fell in on itself. Another, Christopher Hitchens on this program has said that the dissidents did it. He places great emphasis on the dissident movement in Eastern Europe, he's a good friend of Vaclav Havel, and Christopher Hitchens has gone so far as to say that the United States and in particular, Ronald Reagan, were virtually irrelevant. It would have happened as it happened if Ronald Reagan had never been born. So my question is, what was the role of the United States, from zero to negative – there are those who say that Ronald Reagan's military buildup prolonged the cold war, to having some effect?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, hundred percent positive. And let me tell you, I think there are three major forces which were responsible for the collapse of communism. Its inherent problem and contradiction of the system itself was force number one. I mean, that was very important. Dissident movement was also important – look I am a little bit impartial in this sense, but I still believe that we played important role inside. Ronald Reagan's policy was absolutely critical and important. So I think the combination of those three things was the most fortunate thing at the moment, because we're not talking about the fact that communism collapsed, we were talking about the fact how smoothly and peacefully it collapsed.

Peter Robinson: What about John Paul II? What about that visit to Poland?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Also – I usually mention three names: Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and John Paul II, that was a triad which was, again it was maybe lucky a coincidence, maybe something, but all things came together at that moment. So this triad on the western side, on the side of western democracy, was absolutely critical and important.

Peter Robinson: Segment Five: Why it matters. About a year ago, you and I had lunch together, and you said a couple of things that I found so striking, I went back and made notes. And here's what you said. This is you speaking to me about a year ago, "the other day," you said, —I got a call from a friend who teaches at Berkeley. He had been talking with a grad student about developments in physics during the Cold War, and the grad student said 'the Cold War? What was that?' And then you continued, Yuri, and said, "I," Yuri, "I was in my twenties when I joined the dissident movement, and you," me, "were in your twenties when you entered the Reagan White House. That makes us members of the last cohort, we're the last ones who remember. How can we tell the story?" Why does it matter? What harm would come to them if our children forgot all about it?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, I'll give you several reasons. One is very simple, the most straightforward, because communism still exists, and exists in very direct forms. There are still communist countries in this world, and the most apparent is North Korea, but Vietnam, but China also remains communist country, with – let's not have illusions about them. So, we do face, I mean, the Cold War is not completely over, as long as we still have direct presence of communism. Now, it still is present in countries which are post-communist country, and which also spoils a lot of things in our foreign policy, like Russia. I mean, Russia is not communist country any longer, but the main communist structure, which is KGB, is still in power there, and it doesn't help us in our foreign policy in many aspects. But there is another thing which is very important: that communism was not simply part of Russian history. The communism gave us the best example, and the most clear example of totalitarian society, in which idea of the big government was developed to its ultimate form, to its extreme. Also during that time, the communism made us focus our minds to such extent that we understood so many important things about such totalitarian society. Now, it's applicable to anything, including us. And there are some trends into direction of big government, even in our country, as we can see, right? If we are not arrogant and snobbish enough to say that what happened in the Soviet Union relates only to Russians and have no possible implication to us, but if instead, we become wise enough and start to learn from the experience of Soviet communism what those trends are, where can they bring us, etc., it would save us many possible errors, even in our domestic policy. So what I'm saying – experience of communism is important in our foreign policy, when we deal not only with communism, but with many other totalitarian society, like Iran, for example. But lessons from communism would also be important to avoid many pitfalls and errors in our domestic

policy.

Peter Robinson: Now, how far do you want to take that? Are you suggesting that the experience in the Soviet Union ought to suggest to us that national healthcare is a terrible mistake?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely.

Peter Robinson: You are?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Sure.

Peter Robinson: So what you're saying is be very careful of middle ground, be very careful of even of encroachments, of enlargements of government that by Soviet standards would look modest.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Right.

Peter Robinson: We always have to push in the direction of individual liberty, of individual freedoms, is that right?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Yes, absolutely. What I am saying is that there are two extreme points which we should remember. There are – and I can juxtapose them, and I actually made the list for myself for big government society, which ultimate form is totalitarian society, and free society. And we can look in different areas of our life, what is starting point? I mean, we don't have absolutely free society, we always make some compromises. But the starting point for totalitarian society and free society are totally different. And we should always remember what our starting point, even in such most essential issue as freedom and security. Let's state these two fundamental things which actually contradict each other. We realize that whenever we involve more security, we sacrifice some part of freedom, and that's inevitable, to some extent, we realize that. But we should still remember that in free society, we start with ultimate security, of freedom, sorry.

Peter Robinson: Right.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: And give away very small pieces of that freedom, only whenever it's totally necessary to have more security. In totalitarian society, we start with the opposite thing. Absolute security, zero freedom, and when the totalitarian government is pushed very hard, it

might give very small piece of freedom, you know, in exchange of – that's very important framework to me. And I think we can learn from communism a lot, because it provides an ideal, pure case of this big government.

Peter Robinson: Right.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Independent whether it was Russian, what years it was, it gives us exact scientific model from which we can learn.

Peter Robinson: Yuri, unfortunately, we're almost out of time. Students graduating from Cal Berkley or MIT, you've worked at both institutions in this country, have no memory of the Cold War. They have no – they were born after Ronald Reagan left office. The Soviet Union went out of existence, officially, in December 1991, they have no memory at all. In one sentence, what do they need to know?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Well, they need to know fundamental principles of totalitarian society, and they need to know how Cold War was won by democratic world. And I believe it's our failure, to some extent, but it's still recoverable, that they don't know. We were the last people who carried this torch, and we should make sure that it's passed to next generation. And there were too many forces, Peter, which – who didn't want and don't want it to happen, you know. First of all, it was – there was still strong forces of former communist governments, but it was also the left in democratic world, in this country, which didn't want to be seen on the wrong side of history. So all of them together said, "let's forget about it, it's irrelevant any longer, we don't need it."

Peter Robinson: Let me – here's the last, here's my last question. How do you answer the following assertion, and I will now quote what Mikhail Gorbachev said when he visited Stanford University in 1990: —The Cold War has been left behind, and it's not worth squabbling over who won.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Uh-huh. Yes, because it's not in his interest. But why do we oblige him and say – look, Nazism ended fifty years earlier than communism. We're still remembering Nazism, it's a lot of books reading, a lot of movies. Look, still now we have –

Peter Robinson: We all understand instinctively that that's a vital lesson that students have to understand what Hitler did.

Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Absolutely. But the same with communism.

Peter Robinson: All right, all right. Yuri Yarim-Agaev, thank you very much. Yuri Yarim-Agaev: Thank you.

Peter Robinson: I'm Peter Robinson, for Uncommon Knowledge. Thanks for joining us.